Juristocracy in Action: The Weaponization of Justice under Poland’s “Militant Democracy”

After unlawfully seizing the prosecution service and courts, Tusk’s liberal administration rigged judicial panels and scrapped random case assignment to persecute opponents and protect loyalists.

The illegal assumption of political control—first over the prosecution service and subsequently over the courts in 2024—served to restore and secure, for the future, the full power of the left-liberal establishment. In the short term, the judiciary became an instrument for suppressing the conservative opposition and for shielding Tusk’s close associates who had been charged with serious corruption and financial crimes. Control over the justice system also ensures impunity for hundreds of individuals from the left-liberal establishment who, after December 13, 2023, engaged in a series of unlawful acts under the formula of a “militant democracy” directed by Prime Minister Tusk. These acts include, in particular, the unlawful and forcible takeover of public media, the prosecution service, and the courts; the open disregard of rulings or decisions of constitutional bodies such as the Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic, the Supreme Court, the National Council of the Judiciary, or the National Broadcasting Council; politically motivated investigations involving psychological torture and unlawful deprivation of liberty; and countless acts of official misconduct.

The stakes are high. The number of individuals facing potential charges carrying long prison terms, and in extreme cases life imprisonment, includes virtually the entire left-liberal governing elite: ministers, MPs and senators of the ruling coalition, hundreds of judicial and prosecutorial functionaries, numerous high-ranking officials, civil servants, and members of the legal profession. At the same time, it is a unique opportunity to cleanse the state of liberal networks of pathological social, business, and political connections—often deeply rooted in post-communist structures. Moreover, the bureaucratic and formal character of the alleged crimes—committed in full public view—renders the evidentiary process almost effortless. This thesis might seem exaggerated or even absurd, yet to grasp its validity one only needs to calmly read the extensive notice submitted in January 2025 by the President of the Constitutional Court, reporting the commission of a constitutional coup d’état and multiple offenses of abuse of authority. The charges are so grave and well-documented that Tusk’s associates have, to this day, been unable to secure the discontinuation of the ongoing criminal investigation.

In the long term, the capture of the judiciary and its removal from democratic oversight and from the genuine system of separation and balance of powers is intended to cement the network of influence—so that even if Poles were to choose differently in democratic elections, courts controlled by globalist circles could block such decisions under the pretext of defending the rule of law and human rights, reinterpreted in an Orwellian spirit. In reality, this would be a return to the past—for that was the actual institutional and legal shape of the Polish judiciary, negotiated with the communists in 1989 by the liberal wing of the opposition in such a way as to guarantee impunity and lasting influence for the post-communist elites. The liberal–post-communist juristocracy remained largely unchanged until 2017, when the Law and Justice government attempted to reform it. As a result of fierce resistance and a lack of determination on the conservative side, only partial measures were adopted, which failed to sufficiently cleanse the judiciary—and what we are now witnessing is the resurgence of the old order.

To achieve these goals, the first step was the previously described installation of loyal court presidents, making it possible to proceed to the next stage: the prosecution of the opposition on absurd charges and the protection of Tusk’s allies from criminal liability—through the manipulation of judicial panels in criminal cases of political significance to Tusk’s government.

Abolition of Random Case Assignment

Equality before the law is possible only when justice is blind—dispensed equally to all, without regard to person or position. This is particularly crucial in the process of assigning cases to individual judges. In 2018, Poland introduced the Random Case Assignment System (SLPS) as a structural principle and one of the central pillars of the justice reform implemented under the Law and Justice government. The system’s core was an automated, computer-based assignment of cases to judges, using a random number generator. No human being—neither a court president, division head, nor the minister of justice—could interfere with the outcome of the draw. Consequently, neither party to a case nor any superior authority could influence which judge would adjudicate a given matter.

The reform’s goal was to end the pathological practice of de facto “manual assignment” of cases—a hallmark of juristocracy, a system in which outcomes were decided not in the courtroom but through the prior designation of a “suitable” judge by influential circles. The random assignment system was one of the cornerstones in building genuine judicial independence and one of the main reasons for the fierce resistance of liberal-left circles to conservative reforms between 2015 and 2023.

The system was also a direct response to recommendations from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the European Commission, which emphasized that one of the foundations of judicial independence and impartiality is a transparent, objective, and random case assignment mechanism. The Polish reform in this respect was exemplary: it eliminated discretion and guaranteed citizens protection from political influence.

At the final stage of implementation, between late 2018 and early 2019, as the Minister’s Plenipotentiary for Digitalization and Cybersecurity, I oversaw its deployment. Enormous effort was invested to ensure the system was launched as soon as possible, including the randomization of all judges—also those sitting in three-judge panels. It was not easy; it required intensive daily work by an entire team of programmers and judges to meet the deadline. Three-judge panels, which typically adjudicate appeals in more significant cases, are of key importance for ensuring the impartiality of final judgments.

The Law on the System of Common Courts (2017) introduced the principle that cases should be assigned to judges randomly (Article 47a §1). However, on September 30, 2025, Minister of Justice Waldemar Żurek published an amendment to the Minister of Justice’s Regulation of June 18, 2019—Rules on the Operation of Common Courts—altering the functioning of the electronic Random Case Assignment System. In the amended §50 of the regulation, the principle of drawing the entire panel was replaced with a rule under which, for cases adjudicated by three judges, the SLPS would draw only the reporting judge, while the remaining two members of the panel would be appointed by the division head—i.e., in the present situation, individuals designated by the illegal, politicized court leadership. Thus, randomness in second-instance proceedings—a genuine instrument safeguarding the right to a fair trial (Article 45 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland)—was effectively abolished by ministerial regulation.

Amending a fundamental principle established by statute through a lower-level act such as a ministerial regulation is inadmissible and unconstitutional. Appropriate motions have already been submitted to the Constitutional Court. At the same time, the Minister of Justice has publicly announced that he will not comply with the Court’s ruling—an announcement of yet another criminal act, but also an unimaginable deepening of the existing chaos and uncertainty in the judiciary regarding the validity of judgments affecting ordinary citizens. An improperly constituted judicial panel constitutes grounds for declaring a judgment null and void. This is yet another example of unlawful action by means of executive regulations undertaken by Tusk’s left-liberal government, which lacks the constitutionally required three-fifths majority in the Sejm to override presidential vetoes (the veto suspensivum) in the legislative process.

Considering the earlier appointment of loyal nominees to leadership and other key functional positions within the judiciary, Tusk’s political milieu has gained a powerful mechanism for influencing final decisions in many significant, particularly political, cases. This change completes the process of subordinating the judiciary to the executive branch in the sphere of control and in the issuance of judgments in cases of key importance to the government. After taking control of the prosecution service, unlawfully dismissing court presidents, and replacing their leadership, Tusk’s government has now achieved full control over the process of adjudication itself.

Earlier Manipulations of Judicial Panels in Political Cases

Before the adoption of the new regulation that “legalized” political steering of judicial panels, it is worth tracing how, as a result of the unlawful actions of Minister Adam Bodnar in 2024, manipulation of judicial compositions in politically sensitive criminal cases had already occurred, albeit through complex and laborious procedures. Following the regulatory change, the same effect can now be achieved simply by the decision of a functionally subordinate judge loyal to the executive branch within the court’s structure.

In particular, within the Warsaw Regional Court, a special division was created under the 12th Criminal Division, to which the newly appointed, unlawfully installed court president assigned all judges appointed after 2017 with the participation of the current National Council of the Judiciary. These judges were tasked with adjudicating cases of lesser importance, whereas more significant cases—including those concerning pre-trial detention—were transferred to a separate unit of the court. That unit was staffed exclusively with judges appointed before 2017, some of whom had been nominated during the communist era. As head of the division—thus the person directly empowered, under the amended regulation issued by Minister Waldemar Żurek, to designate two of the three judges in a panel—Judge Piotr Gąciarek was appointed, one of the most politically engaged liberal judges in Poland.

Similar actions had previously been undertaken in the Warsaw Court of Appeal, where in August 2024 the 8th Criminal Division was dissolved, and judges appointed or promoted after 2017 were transferred to a newly established Division of Complaints and Motions within the 2nd Criminal Division, thereby restricting their participation in adjudication. It should be noted that such purges have taken place only in criminal divisions. Thus, despite the continued formal existence of the random case assignment system, control over the composition of criminal panels in the Warsaw courts—where the most serious and politically sensitive cases are heard—has been significantly facilitated.

An additional tool of manipulation, made possible through the participation of court presidents subservient to the Minister of Justice, was the minister’s delegation of politically aligned judges supportive of the government’s persecutions to specific criminal divisions. Such delegated judges, having few or no pending cases, enjoyed virtually a 100% chance of being “randomly” selected for new proceedings.

This was precisely what occurred in the random assignment of a judge in a criminal case concerning one of the threads of the Justice Fund investigation, following the submission in January 2025 of an indictment to the Warsaw Regional Court against six individuals. Immediately before the indictment was filed, a judge had been delegated to the division to which the case was subsequently assigned. It was therefore no surprise that the “randomly selected” judge for the case turned out to be the delegated Judge Justyna Koska-Janusz. She is a person in a personal conflict with former Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro. In 2016, Minister Ziobro revoked her delegation to the Warsaw Regional Court, accusing her of “exceptional incompetence” in handling one of her cases. Judge Koska-Janusz considered the justification for that decision a violation of her personal rights and filed a civil lawsuit against the minister. Ultimately, in 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the minister’s cassation appeal, obliging him to issue a public apology to Judge Koska-Janusz. Furthermore, she presided over the trial of Katarzyna Augustynek, known as “Grandma Kasia”—a left-wing activist notorious for her vulgarity and aggression. Augustynek had been detained during a protest in front of the Supreme Court in 2021 and charged with insulting and assaulting police officers. Judge Koska-Janusz acquitted her, concluding—contrary to the obvious evidence—that the presented materials did not substantiate the charges.

Significant insight into the methods of manipulating judicial panels can also be gained from the cases concerning the motions to apply pre-trial detention against me. The case concerns charges related to the Justice Fund, which I supervised and which financed, among other things, victim assistance and prevention projects. The unlawfully seized prosecution service treated the case as one of the most important in Poland, bringing against me a dozen absurd accusations, none of which involved corruption or personal financial gain.

The largest group of charges is based on the claim that, for one month, I allegedly acted without competence, having supposedly engineered a situation in which the minister granted me such powers by amending a ministerial competence ordinance rather than issuing a new one. This is an obvious absurdity to any first-year law student. The real mystery is what was in the minds of the prosecutors and judges who seriously asserted that I had acted with premeditation and then decided that pre-trial detention was necessary.

Another group of procedural allegations rests on the claim that I failed to “recuse myself from supervision” of research projects whose implementation I had previously (before my change of position) overseen in another ministerial unit. This was said to constitute a violation of provisions that in fact amount to general professional-ethics standards—governing the conduct of civil servants outside their official duties. It is worth noting that in Polish administrative law there is no such legal institution as “recusal from supervision.”

The final group of charges asserts that I allegedly influenced the decisions of competition committees responsible for assigning public tasks to non-governmental organizations—despite the fact that, under the applicable law, it was not the committees that made the decisions but I myself as the Fund’s administrator, a point confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of September 25, 2025. The overwhelming majority of the contested projects had a Christian or conservative profile, which corresponded with the prosecution’s claim that I derived a “personal benefit” in the form of satisfaction from supporting initiatives and organizations aligned with my worldview.

In this case, several individuals were detained for seven months under conditions amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment and other violations of law—something even the Ombudsman, elected by Tusk’s coalition partners, was forced to acknowledge in his December 2024 report. Cases concerning the use of torture have been accepted for examination by the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Committee Against Torture. These individuals were detained with the clear purpose of extracting false incriminating statements against opposition politicians.

I myself was unlawfully deprived of liberty, and numerous violations of criminal procedure occurred, including decisions being made by the illegally appointed leadership of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office and—even in violation of statutory law—by the Prosecutor General, Adam Bodnar, personally. In connection with the case, the Republic of Hungary granted me legal protection in December 2024, and in April 2025 Interpol refused to issue a red notice against me. Manipulations of judicial panels also occurred in the course of this case.

On July 15, 2024, I was detained in front of the cameras in a media-political show, even though I had previously reported to the prosecutor’s office of my own accord but was not received, which occurred in violation of international law. As a result of the intervention by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe confirming my immunity as a member of the Assembly, the district court in Warsaw was forced to dismiss the prosecutor’s motion to apply pre-trial detention against me. The prosecution filed a complaint against that decision, which was examined by the Warsaw Regional Court. With respect to that court, Minister Adam Bodnar had just initiated a procedure to unlawfully impose a new president. Commentators point out that the timing was no coincidence, all the more so because on July 12 the vice-president of the district court that had examined my detention case at first instance resigned, submitting a written statement that he was doing so as a result of political pressure from the Minister of Justice. Such a statement is unprecedented and, in and of itself, should have been grounds for triggering all possible actions by EU central institutions—so sensitive to the protection of the rule of law, including the independence of courts from political pressure. Even more reprehensible actions aimed at manipulating the adjudicating panel occurred during the consideration of the complaint in the Regional Court. As to the judge drawn to the case, the National Public Prosecutor’s Office submitted a motion for recusal, alleging a suspicion of lack of impartiality and, as factual justification, pointing to the circumstance that the judge had participated in a promotion process before the National Council of Judiciary after 2017 and had signed the endorsement list for former Deputy Minister of Justice, Judge Łukasz Piebiak, for his candidacy to the Council—as required by statute (It is worth adding that in the Polish legal system administrative supervision over the courts, in accordance with the Law on the System of Common Courts, should be exercised through a deputy minister who is simultaneously a judge, in order to ensure greater independence of the courts and the independence of judges. Thus, as a matter of practice, the leadership of the Ministry of Justice always includes a judge responsible for this area. It is also worth adding that Judge Piebiak was not elected as a member of the Council). Ultimately, the judge drawn to the case was not recused. However, having the case files in hand while examining another incidental matter, one of the politicized judges—Krzysztof Chmielewski— contrary to statutory provisions and, after a final decision refusing recusal, decided ex officio to remove the judge from the case. At that time, the Warsaw Regional Court had not yet been fully taken over by the Minister of Justice’s henchmen, and thus effective manipulation of the panel did not occur, even though the prosecution continued to address further filings in the case directly and nominally to the new, unlawfully appointed president. In dismissing the prosecution’s complaint regarding detention, the adjudicating panel simultaneously acknowledged that Judge Krzysztof Chmielewski had violated the law in attempting to change the panel. It is worth noting that, in light of the new regulatory provisions allowing departures from random assignment for the two remaining adjudicators, such unlawful action would no longer be necessary at all—the unlawful head of division could simply appoint two judges and ensure the “proper” outcome. In this case—contrary to Council of Europe standards—this was the outcome publicly advocated in the media by Poland’s liberal legal milieu, including Marek Safjan, a former CJEU judge, and Andrzej Zoll, a former President of the Constitutional Court.

In turn, in January 2025, in the same court, in connection with the consideration of my complaint against the application of detention ordered by the District Court for Warsaw-Mokotów on December 9, 2025, there was a whole series of manipulations and “tug-of-war” over determining the adjudicating panel. At one stage, the same judge whom the prosecution had unsuccessfully sought to recuse in August 2024 was drawn to the case; however, this time, on the basis of the same circumstances, the judge was recused. After the recusal of the reporting judge, the other two judges were unlawfully removed from the panel; when a problem arose because I filed a strongly substantiated recusal motion, the newly drawn judges suddenly went on vacation or sick leave so that, at the last moment before the session examining the complaint, new judges could be added by lot. My counsel learned of this on the day of the session, leaving no real possibility of filing a well-substantiated recusal motion. As a result of months of maneuvering, the complaint against the detention order of December 9, 2024 was dismissed in May 2025. The panel included two judges: Anna Bator-Ciesielska and Grzegorz Miśkiewicz—the same judges who in 2023 (contrary to the President’s constitutional prerogative to grant clemency, and contrary to the Constitutional Court’s ruling confirming that prerogative) sentenced the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mariusz Kamiński, and his deputy, Maciej Wąsik, to unconditional imprisonment for alleged irregularities in one of the anti-corruption cases conducted by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau they had created. Again, in the current “state of lawlessness,” these months-long efforts aimed at shaping the adjudicating panel to ensure the expected outcome would not be necessary: since the unlawful head of division can now appoint two of the three judges on the panel without a draw.

The protection of Tusk’s loyalists from accountability

The regulation abolishing the drawing of judges for three-judge panels was not coincidentally dubbed “Lex Gawłowski.” Stanisław Gawłowski is a current senator and former Deputy Minister of the Environment and Secretary-General of Tusk’s party, Civic Platform—thus Tusk’s right hand in organizational and personnel matters within the party structure and, de facto, also in financial matters. In July 2025, he was sentenced at first instance to five years’ unconditional imprisonment in a case that began in 2013 (thus during Tusk’s first government), and the indictment included, among other things, taking bribes, money laundering, and rigging tenders for drainage works carried out thanks to multimillion-euro EU grants. The regulatory change could just as well be called “Lex Nowak”: after Sławomir Nowak, who served as Minister of Transport in Tusk’s government from 2011, left office after a scandal involving his failure to declare an expensive watch in his asset statement, and returned to politics in 2016 as head of the Ukrainian road agency. In 2021, the prosecution charged him with over a dozen offenses, mainly corruption-related, on the basis of material collected by Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies, as well as by Polish authorities for the period when he was a member of Tusk’s government and head of his political cabinet. The indictment reached the court in 2023; however, in September 2025 the public was shaken by the news that, at a preliminary session (organizational in nature), Nowak’s defense filed a motion to discontinue the “Polish” part of the case. The lead prosecutor in the case was not present at the session; instead, a managerial prosecutor, Małgorzata Ceregra-Dmoch (holding her post in violation of the law after the unlawful takeover of the prosecution service in January 2024), from the politicized association Lex Super Omnia, appeared and supported the motion, assuring that the prosecution would not file a complaint. As a result, a 29-year-old judicial assessor, Arkadiusz Domasat, discontinued the Polish strand of the case, citing an “obvious lack of grounds for the charges”—without hearing dozens of witnesses or assessing the evidence gathered in the case. In response to widespread public outrage, the prosecution nevertheless announced that it would file a complaint.

Both cases—like many others involving politicians linked to Tusk’s ruling camp—point to a key motive for seizing political control over the courts. The specific steps undertaken—unlawfully installing loyal court presidents, purges and reorganizations in criminal divisions, and finally granting division heads the ability to decide the composition of adjudicating panels in important criminal cases at the appellate stage—serve to tailor criminal panels to political orders: to persecute the opposition on the basis of fabricated charges and to guarantee impunity for allies of Tusk’s administration accused of corruption, abuse of power, and other serious crimes.

An analysis of the structure and scope of the unlawful actions also shows that, after the current administration is removed from power, it will be absolutely necessary to bar from practicing trusted professions all those who participated in building the lawless system of Tusk’s liberal autocracy. This is an essential step for the effective and lasting reconstruction of the rule of law. It applies in particular to lawyers, for whom acting according to the criteria of justice is a sine qua non condition for fitness to practice. The test of professional fitness is not only knowledge of the law, but also a constant and durable will to render to each their due. Nearly two years of Tusk’s rule have shown that the current left-liberal legal establishment has failed this exam.

The long-term objective of using the judiciary as a political weapon is to secure impunity, power, and influence for the left-liberal political establishment. Consequently, a political assessment—also informed by the negative consequences of Poland’s failure to reckon with its communist past—leads to the conclusion that the exclusion of a relatively small, yet sufficiently large group of officials who played a qualified role in constructing the lawless state is absolutely essential to ensure the lasting and effective functioning of a lawful state once the current regime of lawlessness collapses. At the same time, the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed by this potentially excludable group of state officials make it possible to achieve this goal without resorting, in principle, to extraordinary measures characteristic of the paradigm of transitional justice.